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Abstract
Despite considerable research suggesting that creators place
substantial value on attribution – the right to be credited with having
created a work – U.S. intellectual property (IP) law, unlike its
European counterparts, provides creators with almost no protection
for attribution rights. In this Article, we report a series of
experiments that are the first to attempt to quantitatively measure the
value of attribution to creators. In previous research, we have shown
that creators of IP are subject to a “creativity effect” that results in
them assigning substantially higher value to their works than rational
choice theory predicts. The experiments reported in this Article
suggest that creators are willing to significantly reduce the amount of
money they are willing to accept to license their IP rights in exchange
for the opportunity to receive attribution for their work. These
findings shed important light on emerging debates over whether and
how American IP law should adopt attribution rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a professional photographer, and you have
been approached by two magazines that would like to purchase the
rights to publish a photograph that you have taken. Magazine A
offers you $1000 for the rights, while Magazine B offers you only
$800 for the same opportunity to publish your photo. From a strictly
economic perspective, this seems like a simple decision. But imagine
that the circulation of B is considerably larger than the circulation of
A. Might you think to yourself that there is some artistic or
emotional value, or perhaps future economic advantage, to having
your work seen by so many more people such that you would choose
to publish with B for less money?
Now imagine that you are a young and as-yet-unknown author.
You have been contacted by a publishing company that wants you to
assist a politician in writing her memoirs. They give you a choice
between two contracts: the first contract will pay you $25,000 but
your name will not appear anywhere on the book, while the second
contract will pay you $10,000 but your name will appear on the cover
and title page of the book as a second author. Might you be willing to
take the smaller payment in exchange for having your name on the
book? You might value being named as an author because you feel it
is morally right that you get credit, because it will enhance your
reputation and social standing at cocktail parties, or because it could
help you receive other, more lucrative writing contracts in the future.
This Article tests empirically the propositions suggested by these
hypothetical questions and by a growing body of research, including
some by the authors of this Article, finding that, in many fields of
2
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creative endeavor, people claim to assign considerable value to
receiving attribution for the work that they have done.1 Intellectual
property (IP) law in the United States, however, accords only
extremely limited protection to a creator’s interest in her reputation.
Instead, IP extends protection to an author or inventor’s ability to
obtain financial compensation for the sale or use of her work. To the
extent that she desires recognition of her contribution to a work or
product, she will typically have to bargain for it separately.
In earlier work, we have experimentally studied the ways in which
creators assign monetary value to the things that they create.2 That
research has suggested that creators are subject to a systematic bias
that leads them to overvalue their work. This bias, which we have
called the “creativity effect,” potentially results in inefficient markets
in IP, because creators may be unwilling to license their works for
rational amounts.3 That research, however, like American IP law
itself, focused on the monetary value that creators derive from their
1

See KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF
ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (Oxford University Press,
forthcoming 2012) (describing how chefs, open source software programmers,
and other creators value attribution); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel,
Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19,
2 ORGANIZATION SCI. 187 (2008) (describing norms governing attribution
among French chefs); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of
Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007) (describing social norms governing attribution among
American chefs); Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49 (2006) (describing attribution norms across various
fields).
2

Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78
UNIV. CHICAGO L. REV. 31 (2011) (hereinafter Creativity Effect); Christopher
Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (hereinafter Valuing IP).
3

Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 32.
3

work. We now expand that focus. The same methods used in our
previous studies enable us to test the propositions that creators value
opportunities for publication and attribution separately from the
opportunity for financial remuneration. Although the research on
reputation mentioned above has provided strong qualitative evidence
for the notion that creators value attribution, it has made no effort to
quantify that value. The experiments reported in this Article attempt
to do just that.
The experiments reported below are based on a simple premise: if
creators value opportunities for publication and attribution, they
should be willing to trade off monetary compensation for those
opportunities. In the experiments we conducted and report on in this
Article, we set up a protocol that allows authors to make that tradeoff
between monetary compensation on the one hand and publication
and attribution on the other. The results offer new insight into the
value of attribution, and, we hope, will enrich the ongoing debate
over whether American IP law, and especially American copyright
law, should incorporate some form of general creators’ right to
attribution.4 For reasons we will explain, our results suggest that
adding a default right to attribution to American IP law would more

4

There is already in U.S. copyright law a narrow right to attribution that is given
to the authors of a small category of very valuable works of fine art. See 17
U.S.C. § 106(A). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The
Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1992-93
(2006) (describing the limitations on the VARA that render the Act inapplicable
to the majority of creative works). See below, notes 18-19. There is also in patent
law a requirement that the actual inventor be named on the patent application,
but nothing in patent law gives the inventor any right to have his name
associated with his invention as it is actually made, sold, and used in the
marketplace. 35 U.S.C. § 111.
4

likely worsen, rather than reduce, inefficiencies in IP licensing
markets.
Part I of this Article describes our previous research on IP
valuation and the questions that motivated the current research. It
discusses earlier work on attribution and explains our premises for
this new research. Part II reports on the methods and results of two
experiments designed to test the value that photographers assign to
publication and attribution. Part III explores the implications of our
findings for the law.

I. ATTRIBUTION, PUBLICATION, AND THE VALUE OF IP
A. Valuing IP
In two previously published studies, we have examined the ways
in which creators assign monetary value to their works. For decades,
IP law has rested on a series of assumptions about how the creators
of IP should behave. These assumptions are derived from ideas in
neoclassical economics, and they propose that IP creators, like
everyone else in the world, should behave according to the dictates of
rational choice theory. Thus, creators should make rational, wealthmaximizing decisions with respect to valuing, licensing, and selling
their IP.5 In recent years, however, the assumption that people’s
decisions conform to rational choice theory has been substantially
undermined by empirical studies in behavioral economics. Most
importantly, many studies have shown that when it comes to
5

See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).

THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
5

assigning value to things that they own, people are subject to a
significant bias, known as the “endowment effect,” that results in
considerable over-valuation of the owned goods.6 Accordingly, the
amount of money people are willing to accept (WTA) to part with
goods that they own is typically significantly higher than the amount
of money that similarly situated people are willing to pay (WTP) to
purchase those same goods.
In our earlier work, we inquired whether these same findings
would appear for intellectual property, as well, even though IP is a
different sort of property than any previously studied in the existing
endowment effects literature.

Unlike land and ordinary personal

property, IP is non-rival – i.e., its consumption by one person does
not prevent another person from consuming it.7 And because IP is
non-rival, transactions involving this form of property are

6

See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL, Chp. 7 (2008) (describing the
endowment effect as a "peculiarity" of ownership that often affects owners'
abilities to deal rationally); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal
Analysis, 97 N.W. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2003) (providing background on the
endowment effect and analyzing its impact on legal analysis); Ziv Carmon & Dan
Ariely, Focusing on the Foregone: How Value Can Appear So Different to Buyers and
Sellers, 27 J. CON. RES. 360 (2000) (exploring possible explanations of the
endowment effect); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and The Endowment Effect,
20 J. LEG. STUD. 225 (1991) (exploring the impact of the endowment effect in
various legal contexts); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98(6) J. POL. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 1325 (1990) (finding the existence of an endowment effect
when subjects were given coffee mugs and offered their cash equivalent);
Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 39, 43-47 (1980) (labeling the common tendency to refuse to give up
entitlements even when that entitlement would not have been purchased initially
as the “endowment effect”).
7

This is a fact that the record companies recently have learned to their cost, as
consumers duplicated music files and shared them, at virtually zero cost to
themselves, with friends and strangers alike.
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fundamentally different from the sorts of transactions studied in the
existing endowment effects literature. When parties transact over IP,
the seller usually does not give up the tangible property itself but only
the intangible right to earn money through it, and so unlike in cases
of tangible property, alienation is typically incomplete.8 In light of
IP’s non-rivalrousness and the incomplete alienation that typically
characterizes transactions in IP, we thought it possible that the
valuation anomalies associated with the endowment effect would be
mitigated, or perhaps even absent, from IP transactions.

Why?

Because the personal attachment to property or anticipated regret
following its alienation that leads owners in endowment effect
experiments to over-value their property may not operate where the
transaction does not involve the owner’s complete loss of the
property.
On the other hand, unlike any experiment in the existing
literature, the property we planned to study was not simply that with
which owners had been “endowed” but, instead, property subjects had
actually created themselves.

We suspected that subjects would feel

significantly greater personal attachment to property that they had
created compared to property they had been given. Consequently, we
arrived at a second hypothesis in direct opposition to our first: i.e.,
that the valuation anomalies associated with the endowment effect
8

Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 4. Note that in certain types
of IP transactions, alienation is as “complete” as in transactions involving
tangible property – for example where the IP transaction involves sale of an
article like an oil painting or a sculpture that has only been produced in a single
copy. For most IP transactions, however – such as those involving novels, plays,
songs, films, poems, photographs, computer software, or prints – the work at
issue may freely be copied, and therefore alienation is incomplete in that it does
not entirely deprive the seller of access to the work.
7

would be even more pronounced for owners of the property if they had
actually created it.
In a series of experiments involving the creation of poems and
paintings, we confirmed the second hypothesis and provided
evidence for the existence of a “creativity effect” – the tendency of
creators of goods to assign higher value to their works than either
mere owners of the goods or would-be purchasers of them.9
These earlier studies were designed to model the nature of IP
markets, where the goods sold are not the underlying works
themselves but simply the opportunity to seek rents through
ownership of the rights. To do so, we established contests for
creative works. In one such experiment, we solicited paintings for a
contest that would be judged by an expert with the winning painting
receiving a $100 prize.10 The painters (Painters) of the works were
told that they would be competing with nine other paintings for the
prize. They were then told that their painting would be shown to
another subject who had been recruited for the study. That subject
(the Buyer) would make the Painter a cash offer for the Painter’s
right to win the prize money if her painting was selected as the
winner. The Painters were asked to indicate the least amount of
money that they would be willing to accept (WTA) to sell their
painting’s chance to win the prize. Each of the Buyers was then
shown one of the Painters’ paintings and told to indicate the most
amount of money that they would be willing to pay (WTP) to
purchase the Painter’s chance to win the prize. Finally, a group of
9

Id.; Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 38.

10

Id.
8

Owners was recruited for the study. They were told that there would
be a contest with a $100 prize and that for purposes of the contest
they owned one of the paintings’ chances to win the prize. They were
then asked to indicate the least amount of money that they would be
willing to accept to sell their chance to win the prize. In no case
would the ownership of the actual painting change hands; the parties
were only transacting over the chance to win the prize.
Our data suggested a large gap between the WTA of the Owners
of IP-style rights and the WTP of Buyers, consistent with previous
research on the endowment effect. Furthermore, the data showed a
large and significant gap between the Painters’ WTA and the Owners’
WTA. Thus, Painters’ mean WTA was $74.59, Owners’ mean WTA
was $40.67, and Buyers’ mean WTP was $17.39. Differences between
each condition were significant at the p = 0.05 level.11 These results
suggested the existence of a creativity effect – a pricing anomaly that,
unlike the endowment effect, related not merely to the ownership of
property, but to the creation of property. The creativity effect explains
why Painters demanded significantly more than Owners to transfer
the chance of winning the prize. Authorship, our study suggests,
produces a tendency to value creativity more highly than does mere
ownership.
These findings are significant for a number of reasons. First, they
suggest that creators of IP place significantly higher value on their
works than rational choice theory predicts. Given the zero-sum
nature of the contest, the mean WTA for the Painters should have
11

Id. at 40.
9

been around $10 (i.e., a 1 in 10 chance of winning a $100 prize if
randomly selected). Interestingly, much of the observed overvaluation appeared to have come from Painters’ substantial overoptimism in the probability that their work would win the prize. On
average, they predicted that their paintings would have a 52.8%
chance of winning.12 Additionally, we found some evidence that
Painters’ regret aversion (their anticipated anxiety about having sold
the winning painting) could have led to their higher valuations, but
that evidence was merely suggestive.13
Second, and most importantly, our findings suggested that IP
markets may be significantly less efficient that law and economics
accounts have previously supposed. These accounts propose that
initial distributions of property will have little effect on ultimate
distributions (at least in a world without transaction costs), because
property will flow to its highest valued use.14 On the contrary, our
findings indicate that initial distributions of IP may be incredibly
sticky. The original owner of IP, very often its creator, will tend to
systematically overvalue it compared to potential purchasers, resulting
in a suboptimal number of wealth-maximizing transactions. In many
instances, we believe, the creators of IP will refuse to sell or license
their works or inventions when doing so would be mutually
12

For Owners and Buyers the predicted probabilities are 41.9% and 31.8%,
respectively. The differences between these probabilities were all statistically
significant at the p = 0.05 level.
13

Id. at 41.

14

See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L.
REV. 633 (2009); Francesco Parisi, Coase Theorem, in NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 855-61 (Laurence Blume and Steven N. Durlauf
eds., 2007); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 1 (1960).
10

beneficial. Accordingly, in our previous publications, we offer
potential remedies to bargaining impasses, including the adoption of
liability rules and changes to the rules regarding formalities, worksmade-for-hire, and fair use.15

B.

The Value of Attribution and Publication in Law and

Practice
Our previous research focused exclusively on the monetary value
that the creators of IP assign to their works. As a considerable
literature suggests, however, creators often seem to care about more
than just the amount of money that they can earn through their work.
Wikipedia authors and open source computer programmers write
without compensation, but they enforce norms about attribution and
credit.16 Stand-up comics and chefs work in fields without strong IP
protection, but they often insist upon receiving credit for their
innovations.17 These and other creators have a host of motivations
that involve the desire to spread their ideas and the reputational value
15

Id. at 44-52.

16

See Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media, and the Curatorial Audience,
1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. LAW 95 (2010) (describing the norms governing
attribution among authors of Wikipedia articles); Fisk, supra note 1, at 88-92
(describing the norms governing attribution among programmers of open source
software).
17

See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy,
94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008) (describing the norms governing attribution among
stand-up comics); Buccafusco, supra note 1 (describing the norms governing
attribution among chefs); Fauchart & Hippel, supra note 1 (describing norms
governing attribution among French chefs). See generally Raustiala &
Sprigman, supra note 1 (describing how chefs, open source software
programmers, and other creators value attribution).
11

of being thought a successful artist or inventor in addition (or related)
to monetary compensation.
Despite the importance that creators apparently attach to
attribution, American IP law accords it very little recognition.
Attribution is nowhere classed among the exclusive rights that U.S.
copyright law gives to authors – except for a narrow provision, the
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), conferring attribution rights on a
small number of authors of valuable works of fine art. Passed in
1990 following America’s accession to the Berne Convention,18
VARA gives the creators of certain categories of visual art a
waiveable right of attribution when those works are produced only in
single works or in limited editions.19 For example, if a movie
producer licenses a song to be included in the film, copyright law
creates no formal requirement that the song’s author be credited for
it. Thus, aside from the narrow protection offered by VARA, if
authors subject to American copyright law wish to gain attribution
rights, they must negotiate separately for them.
For many years, American authors used trademark law to protect
their rights to be named as the author of their works. They claimed
that the failure to include their names on their works amounted to
illegal “passing off” of the goods as coming from another source.20
18

H.R. Rep. No. 101-154 at 7-10 (describing relationship of VARA to Berne
Convention).
19

17 U.S.C. § 106A.

20

See Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. Rev.
1171, 1200 (2005) (hereinafter TM Function) (noting the “common belief that
designations of authorship, like trademarks, could be determined to be true or
false designations, could mislead consumers as to salient qualities of goods, and
that protection under trademark law was thus required”).
12

This practice came to an end, however, with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., which effectively terminated the use of trademark as a tool for
obtaining attribution.21 The Court held that trademark law is
prohibited from extending “passing off” protection to the sorts of
“communicative goods” that are regulated by copyright law.22
American copyright law’s scant concern for attribution is
mirrored, for the most part, in U.S. patent law. American law has
long required that the inventor or inventors be named on the patent
even if the invention was developed and motivated by the inventor’s
corporate employer. The law has never required, however, that the
inventor be given any form of credit for the invention as it is actually
made, marketed, and used.23
But the situation, at least with respect to copyright, is different
abroad. Compared with U.S. copyright law, authorial rights to
attribution figure much more prominently in the copyright law of
many of our principal trading partners. Most European countries
extend to creators certain kinds of attribution rights,24 and recently, a
539 U.S. 23 (2003).

21

22

Id. See generally Christopher Sprigman, Indirect Enforcement of the Intellectual Property
Clause, 30 Colum. J. L. & Arts 565 (2007) (suggesting that result in Dastar
represents Supreme Court’s tacit enforcement of limits on Congress’ legislative
authority under the Patent and Copyright Clause).
23

35 U.S.C. § 111 ("An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be
made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided . . .").
24

See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 121-1, Journal Officiel de la
Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1991, p. 8801
(The French Code provides that "[t]he author shall enjoy the right of respect for
his name, his authorship, and his work," and that "[t]his right shall be attached
to his person"); Urheberrechtsgesetz [Copyright Law], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I at
1273, § 4(1)(13) (F.R.G.) (The German Code provides that the author "shall
13

number of American scholars have called for the U.S. to recognize
some form of attribution right in its copyright law.25 Although there
is substantial qualitative evidence that creators value attribution, there
has, however, been no attempt to measure that value. Our
experimental framework from the previous studies offered an
attractive platform for understanding the relationship between
creators’ interest in reputation and publication and in monetary
compensation.
1. Attribution in Law and Practice
Attribution–the label we use when we assign credit to a person’s
role in the production of a creative work – can have individual and
social value for a number of reasons.26 Attribution may be valuable to
the individual producer of the work, for example, because being
credited for producing the work may help her obtain further
employment in the field or sell more works in the future. We can
have the right of recognition of his authorship of the work," may "determine
whether the work is to bear an author's designation and what designation is to
be used," and "shall have the right to prohibit any distortion or any other
mutilation of his work which would prejudice his lawful intellectual or personal
interest in the work"); Law No. 633 of Apr. 22, 1941, 20-1, Gazzetta Ufficiale
della Repubblica Italiana, July 16, 1941, No. 166 (The Italian Code provides that
"the author shall retain the right to claim authorship of his work and to object
to any distortion, mutilation or any other modification of, and other derogatory
action in relation to, the work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation").
See Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L.
REV. 41 (2007); Fisk, supra note 1, at 88-92; Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of
Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1377 (2005); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright
and Trademark Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263 (2004); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and
Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2002).
25

26

For detailed treatments of the values associated with attribution see Fisk, supra
note 1, at 53-67; Lastowka, TM Function, supra note 20, at 1175-85.
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think of this as attribution’s extrinsic value. Separately, an individual
may value attribution, because seeing her name attached to her work
produces a positive psychic or emotional effect on her well-being.27
We can call this attribution’s intrinsic value. Finally, attribution may
have some individual moral or ethical value to the producer of the
work as a legal and social recognition of her relationship to the
work.28 We can call this attribution’s moral value.29
Apart from its individual value, assigning attribution to
creators may have social value. Connecting a creator with her work
can aid consumers in making decisions about which products to
buy,30 and it can assist industries and individuals in assigning credit
and blame to the successes and failures of products.31 Throughout
this Article, however, we will be directly concerned with the ways in
which attribution confers individual value.
Because of the value that creators seem to attach to
attribution, European IP regimes grant creators various forms of
27

See Fisk, supra note 1, at 50 (“Credit is instrumentally beneficial in establishing a
reputation and intrinsically valuable simply for the pleasure of being
acknowledged.”); ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 64
(1999) (“The ‘utility function’ Linux hackers are maximizing is not classically
economic, but is the intangible reward of their own ego satisfaction and
reputation among other hackers.”).
28

See Kwall, supra note 25.

29

We do not intend to suggest that these different values are mutually exclusive.
They almost certainly are not.
30

See Lastowka, TM Function, supra note 20, at 1179 (“Authorial attribution
furthers the interests of consumers by reducing the costs of searching for
creative content.”); Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU
L. REV. 55, 61-62 (2007).
31

Fisk, supra note 1, at 61 (“…there are circumstances in which people think it
important to plan for failure and to design attribution regimes whose purpose is
to allocate blame.”).
15

rights to be named as the authors or inventors of their works. For
example, the United Kingdom provides authors of certain
copyrightable works with a waivable right to be named as the author
of their works in a clear and reasonably prominent manner.32 Other
countries, however, have established non-waivable attribution rights
as part of an author’s complement of “moral rights.” The Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne
Convention”)33 is the primary reference for moral rights in
international law. Since 1928, the Berne Convention has codified the
moral rights of attribution and integrity.34 Further, many countries
have included moral rights of attribution in their IP laws.35 Most
notably, France and Italy have statutorily granted authors a perpetual,

32

Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act §§77-78 (1988). See LIONEL BENTLY &
BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 244-49 (3rd ed. 2009).
33

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter "Berne Convention"].
34

Berne Convention, art. 6bis(1). See Also Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli,
Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J.
LEG. STUD. 195 (1997); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right,
38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10 (1985).
35

See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 121-1, Journal Officiel de la
Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1991, p. 8801
(The French Code provides that "[t]he author shall enjoy the right of respect for
his name, his authorship, and his work," and that "[t]his right shall be attached to
his person"); Urheberrechtsgesetz [Copyright Law], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I at
1273, § 4(1)(13) (F.R.G.) (The German Code provides that the author "shall have
the right of recognition of his authorship of the work," may "determine whether
the work is to bear an author's designation and what designation is to be used,"
and "shall have the right to prohibit any distortion or any other mutilation of his
work which would prejudice his lawful intellectual or personal interest in the
work"); Law No. 633 of Apr. 22, 1941, 20, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica
Italiana, July 16, 1941, No. 166 (The Italian Code provides that "the author shall
retain the right to claim authorship of his work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation or any other modification of, and other derogatory action in relation
to, the work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation").
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inalienable right to attribution.36 Some countries (again, most notably,
France) have granted some artists a “droit de suite” --i.e., a right to
royalties on the resale of works.37 As should be clear, many other
countries have placed a much stronger emphasis on protecting artists’
moral rights than the United States, and they have sought to enforce
these rights by international treaty.
Despite evidence that creators value attribution as well as pressure
from international treaty obligations, the U.S. has been reluctant to
recognize strong forms of attribution rights. The paucity of formal IP
protection for attribution rights in the U.S. does not, however, mean
that creators are unable to obtain credit for their efforts; it simply
means that creators must seek other outlets for protecting their
interests in attribution. Instead of being a subject of IP law,
attribution in the U.S. becomes a subject of contract law and the
operation of social norms.
In many creative fields, attribution is a matter of bargaining
between initial creators and subsequent producers of content.38 As in
the example used at the beginning of the Article, the photographer
desiring a published credit with her photograph may insist on the
36

See Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 121-1, § 2, Journal Officiel de la
Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1991, p. 8801
(declaring the right "perpetual, inalienable, and indefeasible"); Law No. 633 of
Apr. 22, 1941, 22-23, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, July 16, 1941,
No. 166 (declaring both that the right is inalienable and that it "may be asserted
without limitation of time" by his descendants and their descendants).
See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 122-8 (declaring that "[a]uthors
of graphic and three-dimensional works ... have an inalienable right ... to
participate in the proceeds of any sale of such work").
37

38

See Lastowka, TM Function, supra note 20, at 1174 (“…authors may use
copyright as a lever to demand attributions of authorship”).
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inclusion of a contract provision providing for credit as part of the
bargain she strikes with the newspaper, and it may affect the price she
gets paid for her work. Relatedly, creators in some fields, especially
those involving computers and the Internet, often attach licenses to
the use of their work that require attribution.39 The most common of
these licenses are established by the Creative Commons organization.
Approximately 98% of the people who choose Creative Commons
licenses demand attribution, and so since 2004 Creative Commons
has not offered a license that does not include an attribution
requirement.40
In many industries, attribution practices are the subject of
complex bargaining between parties.41 In the movie industry, for
example, who gets credit and how they receive it (including the order,
font, and size of their names) are determined by contracts negotiated
between the movie studios and the guilds representing the various
members of the industry.42 In other fields, attribution is governed by
more-or-less formalized norms. Attribution practices for scientific
research have been proposed by the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors. The guidelines dictate who should be named
as a paper’s author and in what order.43 In other creative fields,
however, there are few or no norms governing attribution.

In

39

Lastowka, Digital Attribution, supra note 25, at 59.

40

See Glen Otis Brown, Announcing (and explaining) our new 2.0 licenses, May
25, 2004, available at http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216.
41

See Fisk, supra note 1, at 76-101.

42

Id. at 76-81.

43

Id. at 83.
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graphic design and elite cuisine, for example, there appears to be little
attempt to formalize the norms regarding attribution.44
The apparent value that creators attach to attribution has led to
calls from a variety of scholars for enhanced legal protection for
attribution and credit in the U.S. Interestingly, as Rebecca Tushnet
notes, proponents of strengthened attribution laws come from both
“high protectionist” and “low protectionist” camps.45 Whereas high
protectionists favor attribution rights as part of enhancing authors’
opportunities for complete economic and moral control of their
works, low protectionists support attribution as a way of protecting
some degree of authors’ interests in the face of uncompensated and
uncontrolled uses that they might otherwise not support.46 Although
the proposals for enhancing attribution rights diverge in many ways,
support for legal recognition of some sort of right to attribution
appears to be increasing. Despite this interest, however, there has
been little previous study of the quantitative value of such a right, or
whether installing such a right as the default rule in copyright law
would tend in general to ease or impede bargaining over rights to
copy, distribute, and use creative works.
2. Modeling the Value of Attribution and Publication
If creators value opportunities for attribution and publication,
then they should be willing to trade off some monetary return on
their works in favor of those opportunities. It is possible,
44

Id. at 86-7; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 1.

45

Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and the Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
789, 792-93.
46

Id.
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furthermore, that they value publication and attribution so much that
the WTA-WTP gap that we have seen in our previous studies
disappears. Thus, if the composer of a musical work places so much
value merely on the opportunity to have her song heard or to
improve her reputation as a composer, she might not insist on very
much money at all to transfer her IP rights in the song to someone
who would like to include it in a Hollywood movie. As Greg
Lastowka has suggested, open source computer coding can be
thought of in this way.47 Open source coders allow their work to be
freely distributed to the public on condition that they receive
attribution for their efforts. Although their coding potentially has
positive economic value, coders set the price of access at the point
where it maximizes reputational gains, i.e., at $0.48 The same can be
said of those who use Creative Commons licenses that require
attribution or of those who voluntarily write and edit Wikipedia
entries.49
If this kind of attribution-based price discounting occurs often, IP
markets may in fact be more efficient than we had given them credit
for in our earlier work. Because creators are typically not given
attribution rights by U.S. IP law, they will have to bargain for them.
Presumably, this desire will drive down the price of licensing their
works relative to licenses that do not provide for attribution. By
contrast, however, it is possible that some creators will be resistant to
the idea of having their work published without attribution. They
47

Lastowka, Digital Attribution, supra note 25, at 59.

48

Id.

49

Garon, supra note 16, at 107.
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might believe that it is inappropriate or immoral for the work to be
published without an indication of its creator.50 Accordingly, such
creators would be less attracted to publication without attribution
than they would be to monetary compensation standing alone. Both
of these possibilities receive at least anecdotal support.51
The experiments reported below test these propositions.
Following earlier literature, we assume that creators value
opportunities for publication and for attribution. Accordingly, when
given a chance to trade off monetary compensation for those
opportunities, they will do so, resulting in lower WTA numbers that
are closer to the prices that prospective buyers might be willing to
pay for them.
It is worth noting one of the assumptions of this model. Earlier
we explained that creators might value attribution for economic
and/or moral reasons. They might desire attribution as an
opportunity to achieve greater financial or artistic success in the
future, and they might desire attribution because they believe they
have some ethical right to have their names attached to their works.
Although one of these preferences is economic and the other moral,
we assume that whichever reason the creator has for valuing
50

The attractiveness of attribution requirements in Creative Commons licenses
suggests as much.
51

See,
e.g., Ghostwriting
FAQs, http://www.dmlowery.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti
cle&id=2&Itemid=7 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("Q: Does the ghostwriter get a
credit on the book? As mentioned above, depending on the arrangement,
attribution or even co-author credit could be negotiated. If so, the fee structure
usually changes or decreases"); 7 Questions to Ask Before you Hire a
Ghostwriter, http://www.writeanonfictionbook.com/ARTICLES/7_Question_
Ghostwriter.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("Acknowledgement in print is
often considered part of the fee")..
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attribution, she will be willing to engage in market exchanges to
receive it.

II. THE CURRENT STUDIES
We performed two separate experiments to test the propositions
discussed above. The first involved “lay” creative subjects – those
who indicated an interest in photography. The second involved
professional and serious amateur creators.
A. Mechanical Turk Study
1. MTurk Methods
For the first experiment, we recruited two hundred
participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk), a service that
connects people with online “human intelligence tasks”, or HITs.52
We listed a HIT on mTurk titled “Aspiring Photographers Wanted
for a Contest and Study About How People Use Digital Photos.” We
also provided a short description of the task.53
mTurk participants were directed to the Qualtrics survey site,54
where they consented to participate in the study. They uploaded a
digital picture that they had taken themselves, and were instructed

52

See https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome

53

Subjects were told, “You will upload a digital photo of nature that you've taken
and answer some questions about it. Your photo will then be entered in a contest
and judged by photography experts. Prizes may include cash and/or publication
on a major website.”
54

See http://www.qualtrics.com/
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that it was not to include any people.55 The contest rules appeared
next; participants learned that their photo would be judged against 99
other photographs by a photography expert and that the winning
photograph would receive a prize of $1000.
At this point, the participants were randomly assigned to one
of three conditions:
1) Contest Condition: In this condition, participants were told
that their photo would be viewed by another participant before any
judging would take place. The buyer would make a cash offer which,
if accepted by the photographer, would result in the transfer of the
opportunity to win the $1000 prize from the photographer to the
buyer. The offer was not for the photograph itself, but only for the
right to be paid the prize if the photograph was judged the winner.
We’ll refer to this as the photograph’s contest rights.
Once informed of the rules, the photographer’s willingness to
accept (WTA) was elicited: that is, she was asked to specify the lowest
amount she would accept to sell her photograph’s contest rights. She
was told that if the buyer’s offer for her photo’s contest rights was
higher than her WTA, then she would automatically receive that offer
in cash payable through Mechanical Turk, and she would not receive
the $1000 should her photo win the contest. If the offer was lower,
then she would not receive any cash from the buyer, but still win the
$1000 if her photo won. This condition replicates those used in our
previous studies of the creativity effect.
55

This proviso was included to allay privacy concerns raised by the University of
Virginia’s Institutional Review Board for Social and Behavioral Sciences, which
was the human subjects research review body that approved this study. See
http://www.virginia.edu/vpr/irb/index.html
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2) Publication Condition: The price elicitation and offer structure in
the second condition were identical to the Contest condition. The
change from the first condition involved the prize on offer. In the
Publication

condition, the photographers were offered the

opportunity to have their photo published, uncredited, “on a major
website like the Huffington Post.” But the possibility of publication
would arise only if the photo (a) had been sold to the viewer and (b)
it won the contest. That is:
-- If the photographer’s WTA was lower than the buyer’s
offer, then the photographer would receive the offer in cash. If the
photo then won the contest, the photographer would not receive the
$1000, but would have the photo published, albeit without the
photographer’s name.
-- If the photographer’s WTA was higher than the offer, then
the photographer would receive no cash from the buyer. If the
photo won the contest, the photographer would receive the $1000
prize, but the photo would not be published.
3) Attribution Condition: The condition was identical to the
Publication condition, but if the conditions specified above were met,
the photograph would be published along with the photographer’s name.
Again, if the WTA was lower than the offer, the photographer would
receive the cash offer.

If the photo won the contest, the

photographer would not win the $1000 prize, but would have the
credited photo published. If the WTA was higher than the offer,
then the photographer would not receive the cash offer. If the photo
won the contest, then the photographer would receive the $1000
prize, but not have the credited photo published.
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We structured the conditions this way in order to determine
whether our photographer subjects valued publication and
attribution, and whether their attraction to these prospects would
reduce their WTA relative to a situation in which publication and
attribution were not available. If they attached a significant value to
the prospect of publication, then we would expect to see subjects in
the Publication condition report lower WTA than those in the
Contest condition. If they attached a significant value to the prospect
of attribution, we would expect to see subjects in the Attribution
condition report lower WTA than in both the Publication and
Contest conditions.
After the rules were explained, and comprehension was
checked, participants entered their WTA. Participants were asked a
series of questions about their perceptions of the quality of their
photographs and their emotional attachment to them.56 We also
asked several demographic questions.

Participants were then

thanked, and the experiment ended. Unlike in our previous studies,
we did not recruit a separate pool of buyers in this experiment since
our interest was only in the differences between creators’ WTA.57
Subjects were asked:

56

-- How good is your photograph? (responses were elicited on a seven point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very Bad) to 7 (Very Good)).
-- What are the chances (the probability) that your photograph is going to
win the prize? (responses were elicited on a 0-100 slider scale, indicating a
percentage).
-- How would you rate your level of personal and emotional investment or
attachment to your photograph? (responses were elicited on a seven point Likert
scale from 1 (Very Low) to 7 (Very High)).
57

We received permission from the IRB to engage in this minor deceit, and
subjects were told about it at the end of the experiment.
25

2. MTurk Results
Of the 200 participants recruited using mTurk, twenty were
excluded for answering one or both of the rule comprehension
questions incorrectly. Based on the scholarly literature reviewed
above, we hypothesized that creators would find the prospect of
publication with attribution to be the most valuable, and, thus, that
the WTA for the Attribution condition would be significantly lower
than in the Publication or Contest conditions.58 Our hypotheses with
respect to the Publication condition were less clear. If subjects valued
the opportunity to get their work “out there” even without their
names attached, then WTA in the Publication condition should be
lower than in the Contest condition. But if subjects were indifferent
to the opportunity for publication without credit or, moreover, if
they were hostile to the idea, then WTA in the Publication and
Contest conditions should not diverge.
We first compare participants in either the Contest or Publication
condition, on the one hand, and those in the Attribution condition.
The subjects in the Attribution condition did, as expected, report a
significantly lower WTA than “Contest/Publication” subjects – i.e.,
subjects

in

those

two

conditions

grouped

together

(Contest/Publication M = $202.26, Attribution M = $132.28, t =
1.98, p = .05). Thus, when subjects were offered a chance to receive
credit along with publication of their work, they significantly reduced
58

Recall that because of the way our study is designed, attaching a higher value to
attribution should result in a lower WTA in the Attribution condition, because
creators are willing to sacrifice more monetary compensation in order to receive
attribution.
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the amount of money they were willing to accept to part with their
chance to win the $1000 contest. Furthermore, participants in the
Attribution condition reported lower WTA than participants in the
Publication condition standing alone (i.e., not grouped with the
Contest condition) (Publication M = $226.76, Attribution M =
$132.28, t = 1.97, p = .052), and this difference was on the edge of
significance.
Interestingly, the other dyadic comparisons were not significant at
the .05 confidence level. Subjects’ WTA in the Attribution condition
was lower than in the Contest condition but only at the p = .10 level
of significance. The difference between Publication and Contest was
also significant at p = .10, but in the wrong direction. Subjects’ WTA for
publication without credit was higher than it was merely for the chance
to win the prize. See Table 1 and Figure 1, below.
TABLE 1
Condition

N

Mean

SD

Contest

60

177.35

260.86

Publication

61

226.76a

330.58

Attribution

59

132.28a,b

174.92

Contest + Publication

121

202.26b

297.85
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FIGURE 1
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Contest

Publication

Name

Contest +
Publication

a: means differ at a p< .10 level
b: means differ at a p = .05 level
There are several things we draw from these results. First,
they align with what we have found in previous related experiments59
involving poems and paintings – i.e., that the creators of works value
them substantially more than rational choice theory predicts. Our
photographers behaved similarly to the poets and painters in our
previous experiments, and set their WTA significantly higher than
their expected mean value. We did not have subjects act as buyers in
this protocol, but given the enormous spread between the rational
expected value of the contest chance ($10) and the subjects’ WTA,
59

Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2; Buccafusco & Sprigman,
Creativity Effect, supra note 2.
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which varied (on average) between $132 (Attribution) and $226
(Publication), we strongly suspect that there would be a very large
gap between sellers and buyers were we to modify the protocol to
include subjects acting as buyers. Thus, while not direct confirmation
(because this different protocol does not replicate the earlier
experiments), our results do align with and support what we have
found previously.
Our major finding is that the prospect of publication with
attribution results in a significantly lower WTA compared to the
WTA reported by subjects in the Contest and Publication conditions,
pooled together.

This finding suggests that the prospect of

publication with attribution has a modest but nonetheless statistically
significant effect of reducing WTA compared to subjects who are not
offered the prospect of publication with attribution.
Interestingly, the Contest and Publication conditions showed
no significant difference. Recall that we were uncertain whether
subjects would find uncredited publication attractive enough to
meaningfully reduce their WTA. We were surprised, however, that
the WTA reported by subjects in the Publication condition was, on
average, higher than mean WTA reported in the Contest condition.
Why might this be? Perhaps subjects found unattractive the prospect
of publication of their photo without attribution. This is consistent
with the Creative Commons data described above regarding the
minimal attractiveness of licenses that did not require attribution.60
Given the strong preference for attribution, publication without
60

Indeed, since 2004, all CC licenses require attribution as a condition of use –
there was insufficient demand for licenses that did not. See Brown, supra note 40.
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attribution may be viewed negatively, which would account for the
higher average WTA in the Publication condition versus Contest.
But the difference, it must be remembered, was not significant at the
.05 confidence level (but it was at the .10 level), so it is also possible
that the higher WTA in the Publication condition is a matter of
chance.
We were also surprised that the Contest/Attribution dyad did
not manifest a significant difference – although WTA in the
Attribution condition was lower than in Contest, that difference was
not significant at the .05 confidence level (although, again, it was
significant at .10). Given the weakness of this association, and given
the borderline significance in the Publication/Attribution dyad, we
read these results to suggest that the subjects in the mTurk study,
who were not professional photographers but were selected to be
representative of the general population, had a modest desire for
publication with attribution. These results suggest that nonprofessional creators place some value on the prospect of credited
publication, but that attribution is not likely to serve as a complete
curb on the tendency of non-professional creators to overvalue their
works.61
61

Subjects in all conditions reported WTA significantly higher than what a
rational choice model would predict ($10). These results align, as we have noted
earlier, with the findings of our previous experiments. Nonetheless, we can
check whether the subjects understood the basic structure of the task by
comparing what the subjects reported regarding their self-perceived probability
of winning the contest with reported WTA. If the subjects understood the task,
as the former increases, so too should the latter. And we do see a strong
association between subjects’ reported percentage chance to win and their WTA
– the r between the probability of winning and WTA is .38, which is highly
significant and indeed the reported probability of winning emerges as far the
most predictive factor of WTA in a regression analysis.
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B. Professional and Advanced Amateur Photographers
We turned next to investigate whether professional and
advanced amateur photographers would behave differently than the
casual snapshooters in our mTurk subject pool. We recruited 88
participants with the aid of two different photography affinity
groups,

the

membership

Charlottesville
group

of

Photography

professional

and

Initiative
advanced

(CPI),

a

amateur

photographers based in Charlottesville, Virginia, and Photo District
News (PDN), the largest U.S. monthly magazine for professional
photographers. In contrast to subjects in the mTurk sample, who
reported spending an average of 5.56 hours a week on photography,
the participants in the CPI/PDN sample reported spending an
We should note that although the strong correlation between the subjects’
perceived probability of winning the contest and their WTA suggests that the
participants understood the task and behaved rationally given their perceptions
of their chances, the subjects’ subjective perception of the likelihood that they
would prevail are, on average, significantly overoptimistic.Only 5.6% of the
sample reported that they believed their probability of winning was 1% or lower,
the probability if the judges picked the winner of the contest at random. Fully
47.2% of the sample responded that their chances of winning were better than
50%. As an illustration, a well-calibrated, rational sample could have at most,
two participants reporting their chances were 50%, and the rest reporting 0. A
well-calibrated, rational sample will have a sum of probabilities of winning (for
180 subjects, each of whom was led by the experimenters to believe that he had a
1% average chance of winning) of 180%. Compare that to the sum of
probabilities observed – which amount to 7862.4% (!) – and you begin to
understand the extent to which over-optimism shapes our results.
Additionally, and importantly, none of the other measures differed as a
function of condition. If the subjects understand the task correctly, their
predicted probability of winning should not change between conditions, as the
assumptions about the likelihood of winning (e.g. how many other participants
there are, the estimated quality of the other participant’s photos) do not vary.
The fact that perceived probability of winning stays roughly constant across
conditions suggests that differences in WTA are being driven by the individual’s
valuation of the publication and attribution.
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average 21.24 hours per week on photography.

Fully 72.4% of

subjects in the CPI/PDN sample reported spending at least 10 hours
a week on photography, compared to the 81.7% of subjects in the
mTurk sample who spent fewer than 10 hours per week on
photography.
The study design was identical to that used for the mTurk
participants, with subjects randomly assigned to the Contest,
Publication, or Attribution conditions. Eleven participants were
excluded from analysis due to failure to understand the rules of the
contest. The remaining 77 participants showed a pattern somewhat
different from the mTurk sample. As in mTurk, participants in the
Attribution condition reported a WTA lower than that reported by
the pooled Contest and Publication subjects, and the difference was
on the edge of significance at the .05 level (Contest/Publication M =
380.44, Attribution M = 234.79, t = 1.97, p = .052). Unlike in the
mTurk study, however, the dyadic comparisons revealed that
participants in the Attribution condition reported significantly lower
WTA than those in the Contest condition (Contest M = 440.25,
Attribution M = 234.79, t = 2.098, p = .044). Compared to the
condition in which creators were merely offered a chance to win the
$1000 prize, subjects who were offered a chance to have their
photographs appear in a major media outlet with their names
attached reduced their WTA by over 50%.
Interestingly, in this sample of professional and serious
amateur photographers, the pattern of the WTA responses was
consistent with the hypothesis that creators attach some positive
value to publication even in the absence of attribution, although the
32

data, given our smaller sample size, do not reach statistical
significance (Contest M = $440.25, Publication + Attribution M =
$287.90, t = 1.66, p = .10). It is possible that a larger sample would
reduce the variability of our data resulting in significant differences
between Contest and Publication and between Publication and
Attribution.62 See Table 2 and Figure 2, below.
TABLE 2
Condition

N

Mean

SD

Contest

20

440.25a

384.20

Publication

29

339.19

409.04

Attribution

28

234.79a,b

248.90

Contest + Publication

49

380.44b

398.18

62

Once again, differences in the other dependent variables failed to emerge
between conditions. Most importantly, participants were not more likely to
believe in their probability of winning the contest as a function of condition, nor
did their valuation of the nonmonetary benefits of winning the contest vary.
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FIGURE 2
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Contest +
Publication

a: means differ at a p< .10 level
b: means differ at a p< .05 level
Again, we can draw a number of conclusions from these findings.
First, as in the mTurk study, the CPI/PDN study broadly aligns with
our previous studies involving poems and paintings – in all these
studies, creators reported WTAs that were, on average, far above
what the rational choice model would predict. And in the CPI/PDN
study, professional and advanced amateur photographers reported
average WTAs that were even higher than the significantly inflated
WTAs reported by casual snapshooters in the mTurk study. One
might hypothesize that the subjects in our CPI/PDN study would
have reported lower WTAs than those in the mTurk study because
they had, on average, far more experience as photographers and
would therefore have a more realistic appraisal of their photograph’s
34

chance of winning the contest. But if anything, the opposite proved
to be the case – the CPI/PDN subjects reported an even higher
perceived likelihood of winning the contest (though not significantly
so, mTurk M = 43.68 (27.58), CPI/PDN M = 48.42 (32.80), t = 1.11,
n.s.), and this even more intense over-optimism translated into higher
WTA (again, we found a powerful correlation between perceived
chance of winning and WTA: mTurkr = .239, CPI/PDN r = .383,
both rs significant at the .001 level).
Second, and most importantly, the data from the CPI/PDN
subjects

suggest

that

professional

and

advanced

amateur

photographers place a somewhat greater value on the prospect of
publication with attribution compared with their mTurk counterparts.
Subjects’ WTA in the Attribution condition was lower by a
significant amount compared the Contest subjects. This is fairly
strong evidence that creators attach some substantial value to
credited publication of their work.
Using the subjects’ responses, we can roughly calculate the value
that they attach to the prospect of publication with attribution. The
differences between mean WTA for those in the Attribution
condition from those in the Contest condition is $205.46. But the
photographers only would have received publication and attribution
if their photograph won the prize. Thus, the average value they
assigned to attribution can be thought of as the difference between
the conditions’ means divided by subjects’ perceived chance of
winning the prize. Across conditions, subjects’ mean expected
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probability of winning the prize was 49.5%. Accordingly, the
creators’ behavior indicates that they valued attribution at $415.07.63
We should emphasize, however, that although the prospect of
publication with attribution does meaningfully reduce WTA, the
subjects in the Attribution condition still reported mean WTA
enormously in excess of what the rational choice model would
predict ($234.79 compared to an expected value of $10). Thus, at
least based on this study, we do not believe that the prospect of
attribution is sufficient to eliminate the creativity effect shown in
previous experiments.
A third, related observation arises from a comparison of subjects’
WTA in the mTurk and CPI/PDN studies with those reported in the
earlier poetry and painting studies. Mean WTA in every condition in
both the mTurk and CPI/PDN studies exceeded the average rational
choice expected value of the prize by a multiple far greater than mean
WTA reported in either the poetry or painting studies. One
difference between those studies was the size of the prize for winning
the contest. In the poetry and painting studies, these were $50 and
$100, respectively.

Both prior studies involved contests with 10

participants, so the average rational choice expected value of the
prize in those studies was therefore $5 and $10, respectively. In the
mTurk and CDI/PDN studies, in contrast, a $1000 prize was offered
for winning the contest, which included 100 participants, with a
resulting average rational choice expected value of $10. In each
63

We observe a similar pattern, though to a lesser degree in the mTurk sample.
The difference in WTA between the Contest and Attribution conditions was
$45.07, and the estimated probability of winning across conditions was 42.38%,
indicating a valuation of attribution of $106.35.
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study, creators’ WTA was a multiple of the rational expected value,
but the multiples grew along with the size of the prize on offer. This
suggests that subjects are focusing substantially more on the
magnitude of the prize than on the probability of winning it.64
One might have hypothesized that a larger prize would focus
subjects’ attention on the value of their chance, and therefore, would
move subjects WTA closer to the rational choice value. Alternatively,
one might have hypothesized that a larger prize would be so
attractive to subjects, and the prospect of winning so alluring, that
the subjects’ average WTA would grow along with the prize. This
second hypothesis obviously fits better with our data, and, although
we have not tested this proposition directly, the larger average
valuation in this study relative to our earlier work suggests to us that
in IP markets where the “winner” can expect to reap large rewards,
creators will be especially prone to overvalue their chances of
prevailing, and consequently the value of their work. We can readily
imagine a protocol designed to test this directly and may do so in
future.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY
Our previous poetry and painting studies demonstrated
significant valuation gaps between creators and potential buyers in IP
transactions. These valuation gaps do not mean that IP transactions
64

For similar findings see Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money,
Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185
(2001) (finding that the typical subject was willing to pay $10 to avoid a 99%
chance of a painful electric shock, and $7 to avoid a 1% chance of the same
shock).
37

never occur – obviously, we see IP bought, sold, and licensed in the
real world every day. Our initial experiments do suggest, however,
that because the parties to such transactions might start further apart
than the rational choice model would predict, they will be obliged to
spend more on negotiation to get to a deal. These higher transaction
costs mean fewer transactions,65 and our results therefore raised the
possibility that IP markets might be less efficient than previously
believed. These markets may be clearing at a lower level of output –
i.e., with fewer valuable deals being made – than they would be in the
absence of endowment and creativity effects.
One limitation of our earlier experiments was that the
expected payoff was purely monetary. This differs from the real
world in which the parties – and especially the creators – may
contemplate a number of possible monetary and non-monetary
benefits of transacting.

As noted above, there is considerable

evidence in the academic literature suggesting that creators value
opportunities for attribution and publication in addition to direct
monetary compensation.66 Thus, it seemed that the gap between
creator and buyer valuation of IP might be substantially reduced or
even eliminated were the prospect of publication – and especially
publication with attribution – offered to the seller/creators. Thus,
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See Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1107-1110
(2000).
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Buccafusco, supra note 1, at 1152-53.
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these new experiments are, in part, an attempt to improve the
ecological validity67 of our previous research.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, our new
experiments provide the first quantitative measure of the monetary
value that creators attach to attribution and publication opportunities.
Although a considerable body of research has documented creators’
desires for attribution, none of this work has attempted to measure
attribution’s economic value. Our experiments provide new data that
can help shape the debate about the desirability of attribution rights
in the U.S. and abroad.
A. Improving the Previous Studies
The new data we have obtained from the mTurk and
CPI/PDN studies suggest that attribution opportunities may drive
down creators’ selling prices, thereby dampening some of the
magnitude of the creativity effect. Our new results suggest that
creators do attach some value to the prospect of publication with
attribution, and they reduce their WTA when presented with that
prospect. But our data also suggest that the prospect of publication
with credit is no panacea – while we saw statistically significant
reductions in both our studies, subjects in the Attribution condition
in both studies persisted in reporting WTA significantly above what
the rational choice model would predict. Note that although WTA
dropped substantially in the Attribution condition, the mean WTA
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Marilynn Brewer, Research Design and Issues of Validity, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY (HARRY T.
Reis & Charles Judd eds. 2000).
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numbers were still $234 and $132 in the CPI/PDN and mTurk
studies, respectively. Given our findings from the previous
experiments, it is unlikely that there would have been many buyers
willing to pay this much to obtain the creators’ chances of winning
the prize. In those studies, buyers’ WTP amounts are usually fairly
close to the rational expected value of the prize, which in this case
was $10.68
Interestingly, our data also suggest that the prospect of
publication without attribution has no effect in reducing creators’
WTA, and may even, in some instances, increase it. Scholars who
commented on our previous papers had suggested that creators may
value having their work “out there.” Perhaps they merely want to
improve the world irrespective of financial or reputational gain. They
may feel a “warm glow” of pleasure knowing that they have made a
contribution to knowledge or the arts.69 Some Wikipedia editors may
feel this way.70 Our study, however, did not detect any evidence of
such an effect on creators’ WTA.
Of course, we cannot say that our study proves that creators
do not value publication absent attribution. There is good reason to
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think that they do.71 Our failure to detect any effect on WTA by the
prospect of publication may be due to the group of subjects we used.
Mere publication may have less value in the field of photography
than it does in the more networked and collective environment of
Wikipedia. It is possible, however, that publication without
attribution may be viewed negatively by creators – and perhaps more
negatively than no publication at all. To the extent that creators
believe they have a right to be credited for their work, they may
dislike the idea of having their work published without attribution.
Thus, at least in the markets for photographs that we have
created, attribution and publication do not play so strong a role in
creators’ utility functions that creators are willing to entirely part with
their works’ economic value to obtain them. While attribution seems
to affect the amount of money that creators are willing to accept to
sell their IP rights, the diminution is marginal when compared to the
overall magnitude of the creativity effect. Accordingly, while
bargaining over attribution might make markets for creative or
innovative goods less inefficient than we previously suggested, it does
not appear to produce a Coasean world of freely flowing goods.
Initial distributions of IP rights will still likely be highly sticky, and
otherwise efficient bargains will not be made due to creators’
overvaluations.
B. Valuing a Right of Attribution
Beyond the supplement they provide to our previous research,
our new experiments are also valuable, and perhaps more so, for the
71
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light they shed on the emerging question of whether and how to
provide creators a right of attribution. U.S. copyright, which provides
creators of a wide variety of artistic and literary works with broad
rights to control reproduction, distribution, modification, and the
public performance and display of their works, does not provide
most creators with any specific right to attribution.72

This is in

contrast with copyright laws in most European nations, which
provide authors with rights to attribution as part of a broader
complement of “moral rights” that also include provisions allowing
authors to prevent the alteration or destruction of an their work,73
and also, in some jurisdictions, to claim a share of proceeds from
resale of the work.74
Our research provides quantitative empirical evidence for the
notion that creators significantly value attribution. The normative
implications of this finding, however, are not entirely clear. We
suspect that different readers will take divergent messages from our
findings, and that follow-up experimental work will be required to
better understand the specific policy implications of our present
findings.
1. Implications for Moral Rights Theories of IP
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On one hand, scholars who contend that a right of attribution
should be protected by U.S. copyright law may find support for their
position in the value that creators attach to it in our studies. Creators
were potentially willing to sacrifice a significant amount of cash in
order to have their names attached to their photographs if they won.
As noted above, the estimated value that the professional
photographers attached to publication with attribution was $415.37.
From this perspective, creators’ statements about the desire for
attribution do not merely appear to be post hoc rationalizations of
prior behaviors or of community norms but rather explicit ex ante
trade offs when they have skin in the game.
Yet even here, the implications are not entirely clear. Some
moral rights theorists support an attribution right on the grounds that
it is ethically required as a matter of the creator’s relationship with her
work. This is the moral value we discussed earlier.75 Many creators,
however, may value attribution not due to a moral or spiritual
connection with their work but simply because attribution is a
valuable economic tool for improving their reputations and obtaining
additional work – the extrinsic value of attribution discussed above.76
Unfortunately, our data were unable to distinguish between the
different kinds of value that creators could have been attaching to
attribution.
2. Implications for Utilitarian Theories of IP
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Some proponents of attribution right protection see its
justification not as a matter of moral principle but as a contribution
to the utilitarian system of incentives and access that U.S. IP law
implements. From this perspective, attribution, just like any other
aspect of IP rights, should be assigned in such a way that it likely to
reduce transaction costs and generate efficient bargains.77 Contrary to
its implications for moral rights theorists, our research seems to
undermine the arguments for creating a waivable attribution right.
Our previous studies suggested that large bargaining gaps are
likely to exist between creators and licensors of IP due to the
formers’ overvaluation of their work.78 These bargaining gaps create
substantial transaction costs that likely lead to inefficient markets and
a suboptimal number of transactions.79 Under the current copyright
regime in the U.S., creators who desire attribution must bargain for it.
The findings reported in this Article imply that creators are willing to
significantly decrease the amount of money they are willing to accept
to license their work in exchange for attribution. Accordingly,
compared to a regime with a default attribution right, the current U.S.
copyright system probably results in more efficient (albeit likely still
far from perfectly efficient) bargaining.
To see how, recall the examples at the beginning of the Article. The
party desiring to license a work has a budget determined by its
estimate of the likely value of the work. It may also assign some cost
to providing attribution to the creator. In cases like the magazine
77
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publisher, providing attribution may have very low cost to the
publisher, while in cases like the politician’s memoir, it may have high
cost to the publisher. The creator will also have an estimate of the
value of her work and of the benefit of receiving attribution. As can
be seen in the figures below, if creators value attribution and are
willing to forego direct monetary compensation to receive it, the gap
between the valuations of the two parties would shrink. This is true
whether or not the licensor itself assigns any cost to providing
attribution to the creator. As the valuations between the parties
shrinks, we can expect more transactions to take place.80 See Figure
3, below.
FIGURE 3
Buyer’s value
of IP

Creator’s value
with attribution
Creator’s value
without
attribution

Additional deals
possible with
attribution

Monetary value
Possible deals without
attribution
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Now contrast this scenario with one in which the creator
receives a default attribution right that is waivable. In negotiations
with the magazine, for whom provision of attribution has a negligible
cost, bargaining will look like it does in our previous studies, i.e.,
negotiations will only involve the economic value of the license. This
creates the large bargaining zone that we have shown previously. The
situation is even worse when the licensee assigns a significant cost to
providing attribution, as with the memoirist. Here, we can expect to
see not only the bargaining gap caused by the creativity effect but
also an additional endowment effect attached to attribution. Once the
creator has been given an attribution right as part of her default
endowment, there is every reason to believe that she will overvalue it
with respect to the amount of money she would have paid to receive
it in the absence of an endowment. Thus, the licensor who assigns
cost to providing attribution will have to negotiate over both the
creative work and attribution. This will likely lead to even greater
transaction costs and fewer bargains. See Figure 4, below.
FIGURE 4
Buyer’s value of IP

Buyer’s
value of IP
with
attribution

Creator’s value with
attribution (waivable)
Creator’s
value, waived
attribution

Monetary value
Deals lost due to
waiving attribution

Deals lost due to not
waiving attribution.
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Some creative industries – motion picture and software in
particular – have objected to an attribution requirement, arguing that
providing attribution to the large number of people who provide
creative input to a movie or a software product would be impractical
and would interfere with private arrangements within the industry
that determine who is credited for creative work.81 Creating a default
rule favoring attribution, given the modest benefits we observe,
might make bargaining in these industries even more costly.
These arguments apply to the prospect of adopting a waivable
attribution right as in VARA. Recall, however, that some European
countries have established non-waivable attribution rights.

82

From

this perspective, the economic case against such a right is even
stronger. In such a situation, the parties cannot transact at all over
whether attribution is provided. Thus, in instances where it costs
something to the licensee to provide attribution, and where
transacting to waive it would leave both parties better off (i.e., where
the cost to publisher outweighs benefit to rightsholder), having a
non-waivable right introduces an intractable inefficiency into the
licensing market. In such cases, we would expect deal prices to fall,
although it is difficult to say by how much. This situation would be
difficult to model experimentally, at least with a protocol like ours,
because transacting over attribution is not possible by definition.
We wish to emphasize that our research does not definitively
answer questions about the value of providing attribution rights.
81
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Whether copyright should incorporate an attribution right is a
complicated question, to which our data provide nothing close to a
full answer. They do, however, provide new insight into both the
moral and economic value of attribution. From an economic
perspective, the law’s decisions about such matters should be the
result of carefully weighing the costs and benefits of the right. While
our data cannot fully describe these, they do point to some previously
overlooked costs of creating a default waivable attribution right.
One possibility for overcoming the potential inefficiencies
associated with creating a waivable attribution right would be to
condition the right on the author complying with certain conditions
upon publication of the work. The U.S. copyright system traditionally
made the grant and maintenance of copyright subject to a set of
mandatory requirements that together became known as copyright’s
“formalities”.83 At copyright’s inception in 1790 and for almost 200
years thereafter, the initial grant of copyright was made subject either
to a requirement that the author enter the work on the official
copyright registry, or that he mark all published copies with notice of
copyright (or both). In addition, traditionally the copyright system
required authors to renew (effectively, to re-register) their works after
a relatively short initial term. Failure to comply with registration
and/or notice formalities meant that the work entered the public
domain without a copyright ever arising. Failure to comply with the
renewal requirement meant that the work moved into the public
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domain after the expiration of the initial term of copyright. There
were, in addition, fees associated with the registration and renewal
formalities, and these fees served as a filter – similar to those
operating today in the patent system – that tended to restrict
copyright to works with some substantial commercial value.84
Given the substantial gaps between creators’ WTA and buyers’
WTP that we see in our experiments, some mechanism to limit
aspects of copyright to works of substantial commercial value would
be helpful, because it is only for these works that parties will be
willing to invest in the negotiation necessary to overcome substantial
valuation gaps. Thus, formalities served an important and previously
unappreciated function in limiting copyright to those works for
which a relatively expensive property regime could be expected to
work efficiently. Following the Copyright Act of 1976, however,
mandatory formalities have been removed from the law. Copyright
now arises automatically and indiscriminately whenever a creative
work is fixed in any tangible medium of expression.85 There is now
no screen that limits the application of copyright’s strong property
rights to works with some substantial commercial value.

As a

consequence, many – indeed, the vast majority – of works that are
subject to copyright’s property rule have no substantial commercial
value.

Until recently, that hardly would have mattered – the

economics of distribution meant that few uses could effectively be
made of works with low commercial value. But as the Google Book
Search project – and other efforts involving mass digitization, such as
84
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the Internet Archive’s Million Books Project – show, in the current
environment of very low-cost digital distribution of works, a wide
range of uses of works of otherwise low commercial value become
possible. These contemplated uses, which may produce social value,
may, however, often be insufficiently valuable (at least with respect to
individual works) to bear the significant negotiation costs required to
overcome the valuation anomalies arising from endowment effects,
in addition to other negotiation costs and the risk of strategic
behavior. And again, because these transactions will tend to involve
parties who have less market experience, they are likely to involve the
kinds of sellers most subject to valuation biases.
We have elsewhere described how the U.S. might change its
copyright law to enjoy the benefits of formalities without offending
the Berne Convention, the leading international agreement governing
copyright law, which forbids the U.S. from implementing formalities
(at least as they apply to the works of non-U.S. nationals) that affect
the “exercise and enjoyment” of copyright.86 The results of our
current experiments, which suggest that attribution will play a modest
role in abating pricing anomalies in IP transactions, counsel that
adoption of Berne-compliant formalities would be a better strategy
for addressing the inefficiencies in IP licensing created by
endowment and creativity effects relative to the adoption of a
copyright rule favoring or mandating attribution.
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CONCLUSION
Scholars have often addressed the value that creators attach to
publication and attribution, yet little research has attempted to
empirically test the existence or magnitude of that value. These
experiments have done so with interesting and suggestive results. Our
research indicates that creators do assign significant value to
attribution but limited if any value to publication on its own. The
amount that they value attribution, however, does not completely
eradicate the valuation gaps and market inefficiencies that we have
found previously. Moreover, our research suggests that from a
utilitarian perspective, providing a default waivable attribution right
may make matters worse.
Future research is needed, however, to test the robustness of
our findings. Moreover, our experiments all focused on a single
medium – photography – that typically has low expectations of
attribution. It is possible that in other media where attribution is
standard – painting, literature, and music – the value that creators
attach to it will be greater. It would also be worth comparing our
findings to situations, such as open source computer coding, in which
the value that creators attach to attribution results in free access to
content.
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